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Abstract
Many experiments have demonstrated the power of norm enforcement - peer moni­
toring and punishment - to maintain, or even increase, contributions in social dilemma
settings, but little is known about the underlying norms that monitors use to make
punishment decisions. Using a large sample of experimental data, we empirically re­
cover the set of norms used most often by monitors and show ﬁr s tt h a tt h ed e c i s i o nt o
punish should be modeled separately from the decision of how much to punish. Second,
we show that absolute norms often ﬁt the data better than the group average norm
often assumed in related work. Third, we ﬁnd that diﬀerent norms seem to inﬂuence
the decisions about punishing violators inside and outside one’s own group.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C92, H41.
Keywords: public good, experiment, punishment, social norm, norm enforcement.
1 Introduction
There has recently been a lot of interest in the ability of punishment to regulate behavior
in social dilemma settings, but the bulk of this work tends to focus on testing institutional
boundaries and few papers examine the causes of punishment.1 The notable exceptions are
the neural studies of de Quervain et al. (2004) and Singer et al. (2006), which indicate that
people receive pleasure from punishing norm violators but even these studies do not tell us
what triggers punishment. What rule must be violated before someone punishes? And does
the same rule determine both the likelihood of intervention and the level of punishment?
We work towards answers to these questions by employing more traditional methods. Using
∗We thank Marco Castillo, Jeremy Clark, Carolyn Craven, Herb Gintis, Corinna Noelke, Louis Putterman
and David Sloan Wilson for comments on current or earlier versiions of this work, as well as seminar
participants at the European University Institute, Canadian Economics Association and Economic Science
Association. The ﬁrst author also thanks the NSF (CAREER 0092953) for ﬁnancial support.
†Department of Economics, Middlebury College & IZA; jpc@middlebury.edu
‡Department of Economics, Middlebury College; pmatthew@middlebury.edu.
1Examples include Masclet et al. (2003), Anderson and Putterman (2005), Cinyabuguma et al. (2006),
Carpenter (2007a) and Nikiforakis (2007).
1a large sample of contribution and punishment decisions from public goods experiments and
a novel econometric speciﬁcation, we recover both the "norms" used to motivate the decision
to punish and those that determine the level of chosen punishment.
The problem with the literature is not that the link between enforcement and some
normative trigger has been ignored, but rather that the trigger has been assumed, not
inferred. Many researchers assume that the salient triggering norm is the group average
contribution to the public good: the more one contributes below (and possibly above) the
group average, the more likely one is to be punished and the more punishment one receives.
In the theoretical literature, Falkinger (1996, 2006) models tax and transfer policies around
the group average that are to be implemented both decentrally and by a central authority.2
Ever since its original invocation in Fehr and Gächter (2000), lab studies have routinely
used the group average as the reference norm when analyzing experimental data from the
voluntary contribution mechanism.3
Another contribution of this paper is the recovery of distinct second-party and third-
party norms from our data. Second party punishment occurs when one member of a group
free rides and the other "ingroup" members punish this person. Third-party punishment
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Carpenter and Matthews, 2005) occurs when members of one
group punish free riders in other, completely disjoint, groups. While second party punishers
beneﬁt in the long run if they can get free riders in their groups to contribute, third-party
punishers can typically expect no material beneﬁt to come from their sanctions and given
the potential costs of such acts, it is not clear why anyone would intervene.4 Although the
logic of third-party punishment is not obvious, researchers have determined that it is crucial
for the enforcement of social norms - second party punishment is often not enough (Bendor
and Swistak, 2001, Carpenter and Matthews, 2002, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
We describe our experiment in the next section and present an overview of the data in
Section 3 before reporting on our analysis of the normative triggers for punishment in Section
4. We conclude by brieﬂy organizing our results into three main themes in Section 5.
2The model in Falkinger (2006) is later tested in the lab by Falkinger et al. (2000).
3This work includes Decker et al. (2003), Anderson and Putterman (2005), Ertan et al. (2005), Sefton
et al. (2005), Carpenter (2007b), Ones et al. (2007). Exceptions include Kosfeld et al. (2006) who model
a "contribute everything" norm and Nikiforakis (2007) and Gächter and Herrmann (2006) who examine the
norm of contribute as much as the monitor.
4The study of third party punishment has roots in the psychological literature on the "bystander eﬀect"
(Latane and Darley, 1970) which was sparked by the murder, witnessed by many neighbors who did nothing,
of Kitty Genovese in 1964.
22 A Norm Enforcement Experiment
While our design is based on the standard voluntary contribution mechanism originally used
in Isaac et al. (1984), we allow players to freely monitor the decisions made by other players
and to punish them at a cost. We recruited a large sample of 276 participants At Middlebury
College in 34 experimental sessions. The participants were randomly assigned to 69 four-
person groups, with two groups, or eight participants per session. The experiment lasted
for ten periods and participants remained in the same group for all ten periods, and both of
these features were common knowledge. Participants earned an average of $16.84 including
a $5 show-up fee and a typical session lasted slightly less than an hour.
There were four treatments: a replication of the standard voluntary contribution game
(VCM) which we use as a control on our procedures (14 groups), a replication of previous
mutual monitoring experiments (MM) in which players could monitor and punish other
members of their group (11 groups), and two outgroup treatments in which players could
monitor and punish the other players in a session, but they only beneﬁted from their own
group’s contribution to a public good. In the Two Way treatment (26 groups) players
contributed to a public good that only beneﬁtted the four people in the group but they
could monitor and punish all eight people in the session including the four people in the
other group. The One Way treatment was identical to the Two Way treatment except that
only one of the two groups in a session could monitor and punish participants in the other
group.
The purpose of having two outgroup treatments was to control for any possibility of
reciprocity between the groups as a motivation for punishment. In the Two Way treatment,
members of one group might engage in more outgroup punishment if they expect the other
group to reciprocate the third-party monitoring (Carpenter and Matthews, 2005). If this
occurs and has some impact on the underlying norm that triggers punishment, we want to
identify the change and can do so with the One Way treatment. In the One Way treat­
ment, reciprocity is precluded because only one group can punish outgroup and therefore
the treatment provides the "cleanest" demonstration of third-party intervention.
The payoﬀ function for the experiment was similar to the mutual monitoring incentive
structure (see Carpenter et al., 2006), but we augmented it to account for outgroup pun­
ishment. Punishment was costly; players paid one experimental monetary unit (EMU) to
reduce the gross earnings of another player by two EMUs.5
Imagine n players divided equally into k groups, each of whom can contribute any fraction
of their w EMU endowment to a public good, keeping the rest. Say player i in group k free
5The instructions referred to "reductions" with no interpretation supplied.
3rides at rate 0 <σ k
i < 1 and contributes (1−σk
i)w to the public good, the beneﬁts of which
are shared only by members of group k. E a c hp l a y e r ’ sc o n t r i b u t i o ni sr e v e a l e dt oa l lt h e
other players in the session, who then can punish any other player at a cost of 1 EMU per
sanction. Let sij be the expenditure on sanctions assigned by player i to player j (we force
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where σk ≡ σi
k /n is the average free riding rate in group k, sij is player i’s expenditure
P
on sanctions and 2 sji is the reduction in i’s payoﬀ due to the total sanctions received from
the rest of the players. The variable m is the marginal per capita return on a contribution
to the public good (see Ledyard, 1995). In all sessions m was set to 0.5 and w was set to 25
EMUs.
With m =0 .5, the dominant strategy is to free ride on the contributions of the rest of
one’s group (i.e. σk
i =1for all i) because each contributed EMU returns only 0.5 to the
contributor. Also notice that if everyone in a four-person group contributes one EMU, they
all receive a return of 2 EMUs from the public good. Therefore, these incentives form a
social dilemma - group incentives are at odds with individual incentives.
Because sanctions are costly to impose and their beneﬁtc a n n o tb ef u l l yi n t e r n a l i z e d
( i n g r o u p )o rc a n n o tb ei n t e r n a l i z e da ta l l( o u t g roup) by the punisher, the threat to punish is
an incredible one and cannot be part of any subgame perfect equilibrium. Indeed, the only
subgame perfecrt equilibrium of this game is one in which everyone free rides and nobody
punishes..
Each session lasted ten periods and each period had three stages which proceeded as
follows.6 In stage one players contributed any fraction of their 25 EMU endowment in whole
EMUs to the public good. The group total contribution was calculated and reported to each
player along with his or her gross payoﬀ. Participants were then shown the contribution
decisions of all the other players in their group (mutual monitoring) or in the session (out­
group). Players anonymously imposed sanctions by typing the number of EMUs they wished
to spend to punish an individual in the textbox below that player’s decision. After all players
were done distributing sanctions, the experiment moved to stage three where everyone was
shown an itemized summary of their net payoﬀ (gross payoﬀ minus punishment dealt minus
punishment received) for the period.
6Participant instructions are provided in the Appendix.
43D a t a O v e r v i e w
The next section constitutes the core of our analysis in which we estimate the norms used
by our participants to regulate their punishment behavior; however, we begin the analysis
in the section by providing a brief overview of our punishment and contribution data.
Table 1 lists summary statistics for the experiment by treatment. Mean contributions
vary from a low of 10.65 (43% of the endowment) in the VCM replication to 16.14 (65%)
in the MM treatment. Consistent with most other mutual monitoring studies (e.g., Fehr
and Gächter, 2000 or Masclet et al., 2003), second-party punishment increases contributions
signiﬁcantly (z =8 .91,p < 0.01).7 We also see that the combination of second-party and
third-party punishment also increases contributions. The mean of 12.45 in the One Way
treatment represents a signiﬁcant increase over the VCM (z =4 .44,p<0.01), as does the
mean contribution of 15.67 in the Two Way treatment (z =1 0 .33,p<0.01). Considering
only the punishment treatments, it appears that the One Way treatment does not do as well
as either the MM or the Two Way treatments at generating contributions (One Way vs MM:
z =7 .44,p<0.01; One Way vs. Two Way: z =8 .28,p<0.01).8
To get a sense of the dynamics of contributions, Figure 1 plots the time series for each
treatment. As is now typical in this literature, punishment tends to stablilize contributions.
While Fehr and Gächter (2000) report signiﬁcant increases, most studies (e.g., Masclet et al.,
2003 or Carpenter 2007a) report relatively ﬂat contributions over time. We also see the small
dip in contributions at the end of the game that is common in this literature. Consistent
with Table 1, the MM and Two Way treatments elicit higher contributions from the start
of the experiment. We also see that the One Way treatment only begins to show higher
contributions after the fourth round of play and the VCM demonstrates a slow decline from
contributions near half the endowment in period 1 to contributions near a quarter in the last
round.
It appears, based on the data in Table 1, that the likelihood with which a participant will
punish one of her teammates is similar across the three treatments that allow punishment:
slightly more than a third of the participants punish. Indeed, none of the three proportions
tests yielded signiﬁcant results.Likewise, the overall punishment expenditures do not appear
to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across treatments. Participants tend to spend an average of
about 1.5 EMUs on punishment per round. Of course this average is low because most of
the observations are zeros. Conditional on punishment, the average rises to 4.37 EMUs.
We ﬁnd it interesting that players tend to spend the same amount on punishment in each
7We report the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum statistic.
8In an expanded one-shot version of this experiment, Carpenter and Matthews (2005) ﬁnd contributions
to be higher in the One Way treatment than in the Two Way treatment.
5of the treatments and that they devote about half of their resources to punishing outside
their groups in the outgroup treatments.9 At ﬁrst blush, the fact that people tend to spend
about the same amount on punishment might make one think that the contribution norms
are independent of the treatments, but as we show in the next section, this is not the case.
4 What Triggers Norm Enforcement?
Four principles informed our recovery of the norms used by participants to guide their punish­
ment decisions. First, because we suspected that for most individuals, the decisions whether
or not to punish and how much to punish were not just two sides of the same coin, we con­
cluded that the tobit model and its variants, a common framework in the literature, would
be too restrictive. Indeed, one of the novel possibilities we wished to consider was whether
these decisions were based on diﬀerent norms.
Second, we did not assume, as much, if not all, of the empirical literature does, that the
relevant norm for either decision is the "own group average." Our motivation, however, was
not to marshal evidence in favor of some preferred alternative, but rather to confront the
data with a broad, if not exhaustive, set of alternatives, and discover which ﬁts the observed
behavior of our subjects best.
Third, because we were also interested in the persistence of norm enforcement, both
decisions were also allowed to depend on the extent of norm violation in the previous round.
Last but not least, there is one sense in which our framework is more restrictive than
much of the literature: we assume that the likelihood of sanctions and the amount spent on
punishment are continuous at their respective norms. In other words, we want to rule out
cases in which, for example, the sanctions imposed on someone who contributed a little less
than the norm are predicted to be much diﬀerent than those on someone who contributed a
little more. To this end, we used bilinear splines (Poirier 1975) to model both decisions.10
In retrospect, the four principles seem sensible ones. As we shall soon show, for example,
punishment is perhaps best treated as the result of two distinct decisions made under the
inﬂuence of two distinct norms, neither of which is the own group average.
9These punishment results also diﬀerent in the Carpenter and Matthews (2005) one-shot environment.
10Bilinear splines are uncommon in economics - for a recent exception, see Anderson and Meyer (1997) ­
and we are aware of no other papers in which the speciﬁcation is used to model an index function.
6Our basic econometric framework is:
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where (a)+ =m a x [ a,0], vijt is an indicator that subject i punished subject j in round t, pijt
is how much i spent to punish j in t, cjt is how much j contributed in t, c ¯gjt−1 is the mean
contribution of j’s group in t−1, γ
p
t and γv
t are the (to be determined) contribution norms in
t, and μi and ηi are unobserved individual eﬀects. It assumes that without the information
required to follow individual behavior from one round to the next, it is the representative,
or mean, contribution of the target group that inﬂuences punishment in the current round.
It will prove helpful, for purposes of discussion, to amend Poirier’s (1975) classiﬁcation
of "main" and "interaction eﬀects" in bilinear splines. In particular, deﬁne the "low current
eﬀect" on punishment expenditures to be β1 + β5c ¯gjt−1 + β6(¯ cgjt−1 − γ
p
t−1)+ -t h a ti s ,t h e
eﬀect of the target’s current contribution on punishment expenditures, conditional on the
decision to punish, when this is smaller than the current norm γ
p
t, the value of which varies
with past contributions. In a similar vein, deﬁne the "high current eﬀect" to be (β1 +β2)+
(β5 + β7)¯ cgjt−1 +( β6 + β8)(¯ cgjt−1− γ
p )+ and, therefore, the "change in the current eﬀect t−1
at the norm" to be β2 + β7c ¯gjt−1 + β8)(¯ cgjt−1 − γt
p
−1)+. Likewise, call β3 + β5cjt + β7(cjt−
γ
p
t)+ and (β3 + β4)+( β5 + β6)cjt +( β7 + β8)(cjt − γ
p
t)+ the "low" and "high past eﬀects,"
and so on.
Because it is reasonable to suppose that the unobserved sources of variation in norm
enforcement will be uncorrelated with the contribution choices of others, μi and ηi can be
treated as uncorrelated (that is, random) eﬀects. It would be unreasonable to assume a
priori, however, that the decision to punish is unrelated to the idiosyncratic shock eijt,t h a t
is, to rule out selection eﬀects. We therefore implement a version of the test described in
Nijman and Verbeek (1992), one that exploits the panel structure of our data or, to be
more precise, the correlation of the punishment indicator across rounds. In particular, if the
indicator for the previous round, vijt−1, is incorporated into the expenditure or level equation,
then under the null of no selection eﬀect, its estimated coeﬃcient will be insigniﬁcant under
7as t a n d a r dt-test.
There are two unusual, and context-speciﬁc, complications to consider, however. First,
because subjects could not track one another from one round to the next, it made little
(behavioral) sense to match the multiple punishment choices of each subject in the current
round pijt with the indicators for the previous round vijt−1. The problem is not as serious as
ﬁrst seems, however: since vijt−1 and vikt−1 must themselves be correlated, such matches are
not essential. On the other hand, if the modiﬁed test is to be persuasive, the results should
not be sensitive to the choices of j and k.
Second, because the contribution norm γ
p
t is unknown, the test statistics are also con­
ditional on its deﬁnition. With more than a dozen norms under consideration, it is at least
possible, then, that the test results will diﬀer across norms, with uncertain implications.
As it turns out, however, our results are quite robust. In particular, there is little evidence
of a selection eﬀect, across treatments or norms. In other results available upon request, for
example, we report test regressions for the same cases described in Table 5, and the coeﬃcient
on the last round indicator is never signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Furthermore, a comparison
with the results in Table 5 indicates that its inclusion has little eﬀect on the other coeﬃcient
estimates. We summarize this ﬁnding as:
Result 1. In this context, norm enforcement comprises two separate decisions,
ﬁrst, whether or not to punish, and second, if so, how much to punish.
The immediate practical beneﬁt of this result is that it allows the parameters [α0,...,α 7]
and [β0,...,β7] to be estimated separately. We start with the decision to punish, which
we estimate as a random eﬀects probit under each of fourteen norms. The ﬁrst of these
was the ﬁxed or absolute norm γv
t = γt
v
−1 = k,w h e r ek is some integer between 0 and 25
chosen on the basis of a grid search.11 The second, the punisher’s own contribution, was the
most relative of the norms we considered and, ap r i o r i ,w ed i dn o te x p e c te i t h e rt oﬁtt h e
data all that well. Between these two extremes were twelve norms deﬁn e di nt e r m so fg r o u p
behavior, including, of course, the average contribution of group members. But which group?
Do ingroup members judge outgroup contributions relative to their own (in)group or to the
outgroup or both? Because few experimental studies of norm enforcement concern third
party punishment, these questions are seldom asked. But to the extent that social norms
require the involvement of third parties, it matters, for example, whether the norms are not
just relative, but local (Bendor and Swistak 2001). It is for this reason that we consider not
one but three average norms: own group, target group and session.
11With the possible exception of 12.5 - that is, half the endowment - it seemed implausible to us that a
ﬁxed and universal (in the sense that its value is known to all) norm would not be a whole number.
8Even if norms are deﬁned in terms of central tendency, it is not obvious that the mean
is the appropriate measure. Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman (2006), for example, have
coined the phrase "perverse punishment" to describe the ingroup sanctions that are some­
times imposed on those who contribute more than the group average, but consider a situation
in which the four members of a group contribute 0, 18, 25 and 25 to the public good. If
those who contribute 25 then punish the individual who contributes 18,i ti sn o tc l e a rh o w ,
even within this framework, the sanctions are perverse. From a broader perspective, if it
is the "representative contribution" that determines the norm, then it is at least plausible
that individuals measure violations in terms of deviation from the median, not mean. To
this end, the next three norms we considered were the own group, target group and session
medians.
Sugden’s (1984) principle of reciprocity, on the other hand, implies that the search should
not be limited to measures of central tendency. To paraphrase, it asserts that each individual
ought to contribute at least as much as the minimum of all others in the relevant group,
unless she believes that all should contribute some amount less than this. This is, in eﬀect, a
conditional version of the Kantian rule, approximated here by a norm that is equal to the ex
post minimum over all group contributions, where, as before, we consider three (own, target,
session) alternative deﬁnitions of group. Last, for reasons of both substance and symmetry,
we also include models in which it is the maximum contribution that determines the norm.
Table 2 summarizes the full set of norms that we examined. Because it was also pre­
sumptuous to insist that the decisions to punish "insiders" and "outsiders" - or, for that
matter, outsiders in the one and Two Way treatments - were based on the same norm, we
estimated separate models for each of these subsamples and, in each case, with and without
t h el a s tr o u n d . 12 We use a simple metric to establish which norm ﬁts the data best: which
speciﬁcation results in the highest log likelihood?
With this in mind, the ﬁrst column in Table 3 reports the log likelihoods for all ingroup
norms when the decision to punish is estimated as a random eﬀects probit. To our initial
surprise, the absolute norm won the "horse race," so easily, in fact, that we shall not devote
much attention to the common runner up, the session minimum. (Inasmuch as the diﬀerence
between "place" and "show" was also substantial, it should also be noted that the session
minimum is a relative, but not local, norm, and is consistent with Sugden (1984)). Furthe­
more, the norm that best ﬁts the data is γ v
t−1
t h ee n t i r ee n d o w m e n t . 13
12We do not, in other words, distinguish between the punishment of insiders in various treatments. It
should also be noted that in the case of ingroup punishment, the own and target group norms are the same.
13Because of the slight dip in contributions seen in Figure 1, we conducted the entire examination including
and excluding the last round of data. This did not seem to make a diﬀerence.
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v
t = γ =2 4 ,t h a ti s ,o n et h a ti sa l m o s te q u a lt oThe ﬁrst column of Table 4 contains the estimated coeﬃcients and their standard errors
for this norm. If we limit attention to estimates that are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level
∗ or better, the low current eﬀect on the index variable vijt is −0.142 + 0.003¯ cgjt−1,t h ev a l u e
of which is negative for all admissible c ¯gjt−1. In other words, when the target’s current
contribution cjt is less than or equal to 24, the likelihood that she will be sanctioned by
another member of her own group decreases as her contribution increases. This does not
mean, of course, that expected punishment will also decrease, since it remains to be seen
how expenditure on sanctions varies with contribution levels. In addition, the size of this
eﬀect is not independent of behavior in the previous round: in groups with a (brief, at least)
tradition of generosity, the desire to punish is less sensitive to current contributions, and vice
versa.
To appreciate better the sizes of these and other eﬀects in this "doubly nonlinear" speciﬁ­
cation14, consider Figure 2, which plots the predicted likelihood of punishment as a function
of current and past mean contributions. Its most visible feature is the substantial likelihood
that free riders (cjt =0 )are punished no matter what happened in the previous round. Even
in a group whose members contributed nothing (¯ cgjt−1 =0 ) , the likelihood that any one of
them will sanction a free rider is almost one in ﬁve (18.4 percent). This sort of behavior, it
should be noted, is inconsistent with the standard relative norm: no matter how "bad" the
actions of members in the past - that is, no matter how low the group’s mean contribution
level - free riders are still viewed as norm violators.
The second most prominent feature in the region of interest (cjt ≤ 24) i st h er a t ea tw h i c h
the likelihood of sanctions decreases as the current contributions of insiders increase above
zero. When c ¯gjt−1 =1 2 .5, for example, the estimated likelihood falls from 39.7 percent when
cjt =0to 9.6 percent when cjt =1 0 ,t o0.9 percent when cjt =2 0 .A c c e p t e da tf a c ev a l u e ,
these numbers mean that when the representative group member has contributed half of her
endowment in the previous round, there is a four in ﬁve chance (1 − (0.603)3)=0 .78) that
at least one of the other three members of an ingroup will punish someone who contributes
0, a one in four chance (0.26) that someone who contributes 10 will be punished at least
once, and about one chance in 40 that someone who contributes 20, which is still less than
the norm, will be.
The diagram also suggests that as past mean contribution rises in this region, so, too,
does the likelihood of punishment, consistent with the view that "history matters," that the
response of ingroup members to a particular contribution decision cannot be understood in
isolation. To be speciﬁc, consider the case in which the target contributes half her endowment
(cjt =1 2 .5) in the current round. The likelihood that another member of the group will
14The probit is itself nonlinear, of course, but in this case the index function is, too.
10sanction this choice is not much diﬀerent in a group that contributed nothing last round
(0.3 percent) than in one that contributed an average of 10 units (3.7 percent) but rises
to 18.2 p e r c e n ti nag r o u pt h a tc o n t r i b u t e d20 on average. The estimates in Table 4 oﬀer
qualiﬁed support for this characterization: if attention is once more limited to coeﬃcients
that are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level or better, the low past eﬀect is
0.051 + 0.003cjt − 0.246(cjt − 24)+, which is positive when the current contribution is 17
or less. We would interpret this to mean that "all is forgotten" - that is, the likelihood
that sanctions are imposed becomes less sensitive to past behavior - when individuals either
become, or remain, generous.
Figure 2 also suggests dramatic changes in behavior "on the other side" of the norm. In
particular, it seems that when group members have not been very generous in the previous
round, the likelihood that any one of them will punish another who then contributes all her
e n d o w m e n ti nt h ec u r r e n tr o u n di sm u c hg r e a t e rt h a ni tw o u l db ei ft h es a m et a r g e th a d
contributed even a little less than this. To illustrate, when the mean contribution in the
previous round is 0 - in other words, when no one contributed - the predicted likelihood of
punishment rises from what is, in eﬀect, zero when the target’s current contribution is 24,
to 34.4 p e r c e n tw h e ni ti s25. If the mean contribution in the last round was 12.5,o nt h e
other hand, it rises from 0.3 percent to just 2.8 percent. The results in Table 4 support
this characterization: the net change in the current eﬀect is 4.047−0.246¯ cgjt−1 and the high
current eﬀect is 3.905 − 0.243¯ cgjt−1, both of which are positive when c ¯gjt−1 ≤ 16.
If this is "perverse punishment," it is a perversion that is conditioned on past behavior.
We would attribute such behavior to the diﬀerence in emotions, and the resultant diﬀerence
in "action tendencies" (Elster, 1998), when the contributions that deviate from a recent
tradition of low contributions are either perceived to be virtuous or ostentatious. In other
words, someone who contributes more than the historical average is a model of sorts, es­
pecially when that average is low, but someone who contributes more than the norm is, in
eﬀect, a show oﬀ.
The same diagram also reveals what seems to be a diﬀerence in the treatment of ingroup
members when the mean contribution in the round before is above or below the norm of
24.W h e ncjt =1 2 .5 and c ¯gjt−1 =2 4 , for example, the predicted likelihood of punishment is
29.1 percent, but when c ¯gjt−1 =2 5 , it increases to 42.7 percent. One could interpret this to
mean that those who defect from an "all contribute all" outcome - the mean contribution
cannot be 25 unless each member of the group contributes 25 - are treated more harshly
than those whose contribution is smaller than some generous historical average. This result
should be viewed with some skepticism, however: the change in the past eﬀe c ta tt h en o r m
is not signiﬁcant, so we cannot conclude with conﬁdence that the (still positive) low and
11high past eﬀects are diﬀerent. This said, the fact that so many coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level or better lends some support to the choice of bilinear spline.
To summarize, then, we have:
Result 2. Ingroup punishment is consistent with the existence of an absolute
norm and, with the exceptions of those whose contributions are "ostentatious"
and, perhaps, those who break "all contribute all" outcomes, the desire to punish
diminishes as current contributions rise and past mean contributions fall.
Is the decision to sanction members of other groups similar, in qualitatitive, if not quanti­
tative, terms? We ﬁrst note that the data in Table 3 seem to support the view that, in both
treatments, the behavior of our subjects was consistent with the existence of an absolute
norm. There are several caveats this time, however. First, the norms in the one (17)a n dt w o
(12) way treatments are smaller than, and closer, in practice, to the standard relative norms.
Second, the diﬀerences, however, between the absolute and best of the relative norms are
much less sharp: in both treatments, for example, the session median performs almost as
well, a reminder that not all relative norms are local. It should be said, however, that the
punisher’s own group average ﬁts the Two Way data relatively well, too.)
The third and most important caveat, however, is that in neither case does the norm
seem to matter as much: as will soon be seen, changes in both current and past eﬀects, while
often signiﬁcant, aﬀect their size, not direction. Consider ﬁrst the estimates for the absolute
norm in the One Way treatment, as reported in the second column of Table 4. With attention
restricted to signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, the low current eﬀect on the index variable v∗ is −0.285, ijt
the value of which is not just negative, but independent of the past mean contribution c ¯gjt−1
and, therefore, on whether it was above or below the mean. The net change in the current
eﬀect at the norm is 0.933 − 0.046¯ cgjt−1, the value of which is positive for all admissible
values of c ¯gjt−1, and the high current eﬀect is 0.648 − 0.046¯ cgjt−1. Since the null hypothesis
that α1+α2, the constant term in the last expression, is equal to zero can be rejected at the
5 percent level (p =0 .04), the ambiguous sign of the high current eﬀe c tc a n n o tb ed i s m i s s e d .
As a practical matter, however, the question is almost moot.
To understand the reasons for this, consider Figure 3, which depicts the variation in the
predicted likelihood that outsiders will be punished in the One Way treatment, based on
the complete (that is, signiﬁcant and otherwise) set of probit coeﬃcients. A comparison of
Figures 2 and 3 reveals, ﬁrst and foremost, much less enthusiasm for norm enforcement across
groups than within them, at least in the absence of reciprocity. For no combination of current
and past mean contributions, for example, does the predicted likelihood of punishment of
outsiders exceed 1 in 12, whereas it is close to 1 in 5 when an insider’s current contribution
12is close to zero, no matter what was contributed in the last round.
To be more precise, if the target’s group average contribution in the last round c ¯gjt−1 was
10, the likelihood of punishment is 2.4 percent if she contributes 0 in the current round; 0.009
percent if she contributes 10; 0 (to the ﬁfth decimal place) if she contributes the norm of 17;
and 0.5 if she contributes her entire endowment. If, on the other hand, the group average
i nt h el a s tr o u n dw a s20, these likelihoods are 8.1, 0.01, 0 and 0.07 percent, respectively. In
short, whether outgroup members were generous in the last round or not, the likelihood of
punishment falls from a low but not trivial level when the current contribution is small, to
almost zero very quickly, and remains there, notwithstanding the fact that the high current
eﬀect is, under some conditions, positive. When reciprocation is not possible, in other words,
the impulse to punish members of other groups is limited, more or less, to free riders.
The results in Table 4 also hint, however, that the "hump" in Figure 3 is an artifact
of sorts. The change in the past eﬀect at the norm (that is, the hump) is statistically
insigniﬁcant, so it is diﬃcult to claim that the low past eﬀect on the index variable, 0.051+
0.003cjt−0.246(cjt−17)+, should be much diﬀerent than the high. This is positive if cjt ≤ 18
but once more, the restriction does not matter much in practical terms.
There is some temptation to interpret the third column in Table 4, which reports the
estimates for the same model under one of the best of the relative norms, the session median,
as a robustness check of sorts. Comparisons are diﬃcult, however, because the session median
varies from period to period and, more problematic, the interpretation of the past eﬀect
coeﬃcients is not the same: the observation that the target’s group average was, for example,
2 units less than the session median is less a claim about the level of contributions than their
distribution.
This said, the results of such a comparison are mixed. The low current eﬀect, for example,
is unambiguously negative, and the change at the norm is signiﬁcantly positive, as was the
case under the absolute norm. There is less doubt about the high positive eﬀect, however,
which is equal to −0.167 + 0.038¯ cgjt−1, and therefore positive even for relatively low values
of c ¯gjt−1. Once more, then, the question is, how important is this positive current eﬀect in
practice? A tractable answer requires some additional structure, in particular, assumptions
about the values of the session medians/norms in each period. Suppose, for example, that
the session median in the current and previous rounds are equal and that both, in turn, are




−1 =¯ cgjt−1.T h ee ﬀects
of variation in cjt and c ¯gjt−1 on the likelihood of punishment are then depicted in Figure 4.
Under these conditions, and consistent with the results under the absolute norm, it is the
negative low current eﬀect that matters: in practice, "ostentatious contributors" had little
to fear from outsiders in the One Way treatment.
13We have noted that it is diﬃc u l tt oc o m p a r ep a s te ﬀects under absolute and relative
norms. In this context, for example, the low past eﬀect is the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
outgroup’s average contribution in the previous round when this average was less than the
session median for the same round, which would happen when outsiders contribute less
than insiders or when total (and therefore average) contributions are the same but the
contributions of outsiders are skewed left, and so on. For what it’s worth, then, this eﬀect
is always positive while the high past eﬀe c ta l m o s ta l w a y si s ,f r o mw h i c hw ec o n c l u d et h a t
the current contribution of any outsider "looks worse" the more generous her group was in
t h ep r e v i o u sr o u n d .
Collecting all of the results for outgroup punishment in the One Way treatment, we have:
Result 3. In the absence of reciprocation, there is less enthusiasm for the imposi-
tion of sanctions on outsiders than insiders. The motivation for these sanctions is
also diﬀerent: whether the norm is absolute or relative, the likelihood of punish-
ment falls as their current contributions rise, and rises as their past contributions
rise.
This leads naturally to the question, how does the decision to punish outsiders diﬀer in
the Two Way treatment, when there are opportunities to engage in group reciprocity? Is the
result "one big group" in which ostentatious contributors are pressured to conform? Or is
the response of insiders to outsiders independent of such opportunities? The short answer is
that the diﬀerences are not those of kind, but degree.
To see this, consider Figure 5, a plot of the predicted likelihood that insiders will sanction
outsiders in the Two Way treatment when the norm is absolute (12). A comparison with
Figure 3, the equivalent diagram for the One Way treatment, reveals some of the same
patterns and more, if not much more, enthusiasm for norm enforcement. Recall, for example,
that if the past mean contribution of the outgroup is 10, the likelihoods of punishment as the
target’s current contribution increases from 0 to 10 to 17 (the norm) to 25 are, respectively,
2.4, 0.009, 0 and 0.5 percent. In the Two Way treatment, the comparable likelihoods are
8.3, 0.3, 0.1 and 0.2 percent. In short, free riders are more likely to be sanctioned in the Two
Way treatment - the estimated likelihood that no outsider will punish one is 90.7 percent
in the One Way treatment but just 70.7 percent in the Two Way - but in both cases, there
is a sharp decline in the likelihood of punishment to, in eﬀect, zero, as the target’s current
contribution increases. The same numbers also reveal a common positive but economically
insigniﬁcant change at the norm.
The estimates in the fourth column of Table 4 support this characterization of the data.
Calculated on the basis of coeﬃcients that are at least statistically signiﬁcant, the low current
14eﬀect, for example, is equal to −0.432 +0.03¯ cgjt−1, the value of which is negative for all
c ¯gjt−1 ≤ γ
p
t−1 =1 2 . The change at the norm is 0.660 − 0.052¯ cgjt−1 +0 .056(¯ cgjt−1 − 12)+,
which is positive, and the high positive eﬀect is 0.228 − 0.022¯ cgjt−1 +0 .025 (¯ cgjt−1 − 12)+,
which is almost always positive.
There are similarities in the past eﬀects, too. In both treatments, for example, the low
past eﬀe c ti sp o s i t i v e .I nt h eT w oW a yc a s e ,h o w e v e r ,t h ec h a n g ea tt h en o r mi sn e g a t i v e ,
and the null hypothesis that the high past eﬀect is insigniﬁcant cannot be rejected at the 10
percent level.
This does not mean, however, that there are no qualitative treatment diﬀerences. Further
comparison of Figures 3 and 5 reveals what seems to be a local peak at (cjt =0 ,c ¯gjt−1 =0 )
in the Two Way treatment. The simplest explanation is that when insiders and outsiders are
connected via punishment networks, there is less tolerance for low level outcomes in which
failure to contribute much in the past becomes the reason not to contribute now. If so, there
is at least one sense in which, to invoke an earlier term, reciprocation produces "one big
group."
The ﬁnal column of Table 4, the coeﬃcient estimates under one of the best relative norms,
the session median, serves at least two purposes. First, subject to earlier caveats about
comparisons of coeﬃcients, the robustness of some, if not all, our claims about behavior in
the Two Way treatment can be evaluated. Second, with fewer complications, the estimates
can be compared with those obtained for the same norm in the One Way treatment, which
allows the robustness of claims about treatment diﬀerences to be evaluated.
A comparison of the third and ﬁfth columns, the session median estimates, reveals that,
with the exception of the intercept, the estimates are all close in absolute value and signif­
icance, consistent with the view, articulated above, that the principal treatment diﬀerence
is the increased enthusiasm for norm enforcement when reciprocation is possible. Further­
more, as a consequence of the properties of the probit model, this diﬀerence in "autonomous
enthusiasm" should be most prominent near (cjt =0 ,c ¯gjt−1 =0 ) .
The results of the comparison within treatment/across norms are a little more mixed.
Both the low current eﬀect and the change at the norm (and, therefore, the high current
eﬀect) are signiﬁcantly negative, for example, in contrast to the situation under the absolute
norm, when only the low current eﬀect was unambiguously negative. Once more, however,
there is reason to believe that as a practical matter, the diﬀerence isn’t a meaningful one.
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reasonably sharp decline in the likelihood of punishment as the current contribution rises to
what amounts, in practice, to zero.
15We consolidate all of these observation in the form of two more results:
Result 4. There is limited evidence that the decision to punish either insiders or
outsiders is best explained in terms of the diﬀerence between individual and local
mean group behavior. There is more evidence that here, too, the relevant norms
are absolute or, if relative, then session-wide. Furthermore, there is not much
indication that the norms, absolute or relative, are sensitive to the existence of
reciprocal punishment networks.
Result 5. There is some, but not much, more enthusiasm for norm enforcement
when reciprocation is possible, especially in the case of free riders. Otherwise,
punishment patterns are quite similar: the likelihood of sanctions from outside
declines with current contributions and, with some caveats, increases a little
with past mean contributions.
We noted earlier that the mere fact that punishment is more or less probable does not
mean that the expected level of punishment will rise or fall, too. And while it would be
a mistake to assume that the level is all that matters - as the recent ﬁeld experiments of
Carpenter and Seki (2005) remind us, the act of disapproval itself, even when it imposes no
direct costs, can inﬂuence behavior - the question of what, conditional on the decision to
punish, determines its level is critical.
To this end, we start, as before, with insiders. The ﬁrst column of Table 5 reports the log
likelihoods for each of the same norms for the random eﬀects maximum likelihood estimator.
The best absolute norm, for the decision of how much to punish other insiders is 7.T w o
o t h e rf e a t u r e so ft h ed a t ai nT a b l e5m e r i ta t t e n t i o n .F i r s t ,w ew e r es u r p r i s e d-e v e nm o r e
so than we were in the case of the decision to punish - to discover that with the exception of
outsiders in the One Way treatment, absolute norms explained the variation in punishment
levels as well, and often better, than relative norms. Second, in this case, some of the
best relative norms are local: both the own group median and the own contribution, for
example, perform quite well. If robust, these results constitute an important, and heretofore
unexplored, challenge to the conventional wisdom about norm enforcement: either the norms
that explain both the decision to, and level of, punishment are absolute or, if relative, the
norms that explain the former evolve within a broader population than those which explain
the latter.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 6 report full sample estimates for two norms, absolute (9)
and own group median. There are some important similarities in the results. Under both
norms, for example, the current eﬀects, low and high, are signiﬁcantly negative. Further,
16under neither norm is the change at the "knot" signiﬁcant: as a statistical matter, the
hypothesis that the low and high eﬀects are equal cannot be rejected. It is therefore diﬀerences
in the likelihood of punishment, rather than diﬀerences in the punishment imposed, that
determine the treatment of ostentatious contributors within groups.
It is less clear whether the size of the current eﬀect is the same under the two norms.
With attention limited to coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level or better, it
is equal to −0.067¯ cgjt−1 +0.076(¯ cgjt−1 −9)+ under the absolute norm and −0.169 under the
relative. If c ¯gjt−1 ≥ 3 - that is, if the representative insider was not a "near free rider" in the
previous round - punishment seems to be more elastic with respect to current contributions
under the absolute norm.
Under the absolute norm, the low and high past eﬀects are 0.456 − 0.067cjt and 0.036 +
0.009cjt, respectively. The past eﬀect will be positive, therefore, whenever the past mean
contribution c ¯gjt−1 is 9 or more or whenever it is less than 9 and the current contribution is
also less than or equal to 7.W h e ncjt =¯ cgjt−1 =1 2 .5, for example, a one unit increase in the
past mean contribution is associated with a small (0.15) increase in punishment expenditures.
This is consistent, in both direction and size, with estimates for the relative norm, in which
dp∗ /dc ¯gjt−1 =0 .096 for all values of cjt and c ¯gjt−1.I f cjt > 7 and c ¯gjt−1 < 9,o nt h eo t h e r ijt
hand, the past eﬀect under the absolute norm is negative. Subject to the caveat this implies,
we would nevertheless conclude that contributions tend to attract more punishment from
insiders when compared to a tradition of generosity.
Result 6. Insiders’ decisions about how much to punish one another can (also) be
explained in terms of an absolute norm that is equal to about half the endowment.
The data are also consistent, however, with local, if not personal, relative norms.
In either case, the evidence supports the view that punishment expenditures fall
as the target’s current contribution rises. The eﬀects of past contributions are
more ambiguous but, on the whole, the members of groups with a "tradition of
generosity" tend to spend more on punishment, ceteris paribus.
The juxtaposition of the two results on ingroup punishment prompts an important ques­
tion: if ostentatious contributors are more likely to be punished but, conditional on this,
have smaller punishments imposed on them, are they punished more or less in expectation?
Or in broad terms, do movements in either the likelihood or conditional level of punishment
drive its expected value? The answer is contained in Figure 5, which depicts the variation
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ in b vijt p bijt as a function of cjt and c ¯gjt−1,w h e r ev bijt and p bijt are each calculated under the
best of their respective absolute norms.
T h es a l i e n tf e a t u r eo fF i g u r e6i si t sr e s e m b l a n c e ,i nq u a l i t a t i v et e r m s ,t oF i g u r e2 .T h e
17ostentatious contributor eﬀect, for example, is still pronounced. To illustrate, when the mean
contribution in the previous round is 5 and j contributes 20 in the current round, i,am e m b e r
of the same group, will spend, on average, 0.007 (in eﬀect, nothing) on punishment, but if
j had contributed 25 instead, i would spend 2.28. With three potential norm enforcers in
each group, the diﬀerence in j’s expected payoﬀ is 2(3)(2.28) = 13.68, a substantial amount.
There are similarities, too, in the eﬀects on free riders: if j contributes 0 in the current
round, i’s expected punishment expenditures are just 0.63 if the mean contribution in the
previous round is 5,b u t1.50 if the mean contribution was 10 and 2.55 if it was 20.I ns h o r t ,
the more generous the group’s past, the harder its members are on those who free ride in
the current period. To summarize:
Result 7. It is the variation in the likelihood of punishment that drives the
variation in the expected value of sanctions imposed on insiders.
The relatively small number of cases of outgroup punishment in the One Way treatment
precludes estimation of the full model, so the second column of Table 5 reports the log
likelihoods of a stripped down model in which all of the interaction terms have been omitted.
T h ef u l l( b u tn o tt r u n c a t e d )s a m p l er e s u l t sa r et h eﬁrst instance in which relative norms ­
in particular, the session mean and median - seem to ﬁt the data better than the best of the
absolute norms. Because the absolute norm is not a poor ﬁt, however, and because we have
reported results for absolute norms in all other cases, the results, and those for the session
median, are included in Table 6.
Table 6 reveals that the low current eﬀect is unambiguously negative under both norms.
Furthermore, the change in the current eﬀect at each norm is positive, with one important
diﬀerence. Under the absolute norm, it is statistically insigniﬁcant, and the hypothesis that
punishment in this context decreases with the target’s current contribution, even when that
contribution exceeds γp =2 3 ,c a n n o tb er e j e c t e d .I ti ss i g n i ﬁcant, however, under the relative
norm, even at the 1 percent level. The question is then whether expenditure on punishment
continues to fall, albeit more slowly, or rises when the target’s current contribution exceeds
the session median. The answer, perhaps, is neither: the null hypothesis that the sum of the
coeﬃcients β1 and β2 is zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level. The prudent interpretation
of the results, then, would hold that the amount spent on punishment is estimated to be
more or less constant when the target contributes more than the relative norm. (Such an
interpretation could also reconcile the diﬀerent estimates of the low current eﬀect under
the two norms. Under the absolute norm, the fall in punishment is predicted to be 5.05 =
25(0.202) as the target’s current contribution rises from 0 to 25; if the session median is 12,
it is 5.26 = 12(0.438) + 13(0) under the relative.)
18There is also some evidence that, once committed to the punishment of outsiders, expen­
ditures on sanctions are less sensitive to variation in current contribution than with insiders,
at least in the One Way treatment. Recall that for punishment within groups, the common
(low and high) current eﬀect under the absolute norm was equal to −0.684 + 0.009¯ cgjt−1,
which exceeds, in absolute value, the common eﬀect (−0.202)h e r e .
In addition, the low past eﬀect is signiﬁcantly positive under both norms. Further,
while the net change at the norm is negative under both, it is only signiﬁcant under the
relative and, unlike the current eﬀect, the hypothesis that the change is smaller (in absolute
terms) than the low eﬀect can be rejected at the 1 percent level. Under the absolute norm,
then, the smaller the current contribution relative to the mean contribution in the previous
round, the more it will be punished. Under the relative, this is true only when the past
mean contribution is less than the session median or, to reprise an earlier observation, the
outgroup is less generous than the ingroup and/or the distribution of outgroup contributions
is skewed right. To combine some of these observations:
Result 8. In the absence of opportunities for reciprocation, the decision about
how much punishment to impose on outsiders is best explained in terms of norms
that are either relative but not local or absolute. Both speciﬁcations predict
that the level of punishment will fall, at similar rates, as the target’s current
contribution rises. Punishment is also predicted to rise with the past mean
contribution of the outgroup when that contribution is either small (absolute
norm) or smaller than the ingroup’s.
Since the likelihood and level of punishment functions have more or less the same "shape,"
the contours of the expected punishment function are not diﬃcult to infer. We nevertheless
∗ ∗ construct such a diagram (Figure 7) for the case where both components b vijt and p bijt are
estimated on the basis of the full coeﬃcient set under their respective absolute norms, in
part to facilitate comparisons with the punishment that insiders (Figure 6) and outsiders
able to reciprocate (Figure 8) should expect. It is clear from Figure 7, for example, that
previous observations about diﬀerences in the enthusiasm for norm enforcement within and
between groups extend to the expected level of punishment. In the absence of opportunities
for reciprocation, for example, there is no combination of current and past mean contribution
for which the expected punishment of an outsider is more than one. In contrast, the sanctions
imposed on at least two sorts of insiders - ostentatious contributors and free riders - exceed
this threshold. To illustrate, someone who free rides when the past mean contribution was 20
should expect each of the (three) other members of her group to spend 2.55 on punishment
on average, but each of the four members of the outgroup to spend just 0.67.I ns u m ,
19Result 9. In the absence of opportunities for reciprocation, the expected punish-
ment of outsiders exhibits the same qualitative features as the likelihood of their
punishment: it declines, for example, with the target’s current contribution but
is less, ceteris paribus, than the punishment imposed on the "equivalent insider."
Unlike the likelihood of punishment, there are dramatic diﬀerences in the estimated
determinants of how much outsiders are punished in the One and Two Way treatments. The
diﬀerences do not include the norm itself, however: once more, an absolute norm and the
session median ﬁt the data well. (This said, the value of the absolute norm (17) is not an
extreme one, and therefore closer to that which describes behavior within groups.) Under




−0.659 + 0.044¯ if c ¯gjt−1 ≤ 17 ijt cgjt−1
dcjt 1.500 − 0.083¯ cgjt−1 if c ¯gjt−1 > 17





7.649 − 0.483¯ if c ¯gjt−1 ≤ 17 ijt cgjt−1
dcjt −3.673 + 0.183¯ cgjt−1 if c ¯gjt−1 > 17
which is almost always positive when c ¯gjt−1 is below the norm. Indeed, when the past mean
contribution is small, the eﬀect is not just positive, but substantial: if no member of the
outgroup contributes in the previous round, for example, punishment is predicted to increase
more than 7 units for each unit of current contribution in excess of the norm.
Is this a statistical artifact, or evidence of an ostentatious contributor eﬀect that tran­
scends group boundaries? The estimation results for the relative norm, in the last column of
Table 5, provide no more than an imperfect robustness check - few coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at even the 10 percent level - but are, on balance, consistent with the existence of conformist
pressure. With attention restricted to these few coeﬃcients, the low current eﬀect is 0,a n d




3.653 − 0.211¯ if c ¯gjt−1 ≤ γ
p
ijt cgjt−1 t−1
dcjt (3.673 − 0.142γt
p
−1) − 0.069¯ cgjt−1 if c ¯gjt−1 >γ
p
t−1
Consistent with predicted behavior under the absolute norm, the eﬀect is positive if, for
example, c ¯gjt−1 ≤ min[γ
p
t−1,17.3] or the contribution of the representative outgroup member’s
contribution in the previous round is "small" in the double sense that it is less than 17 and
the session median. (It will also be positive under another, less intuitive, condition, namely,
γ
p
t−1 < c ¯gjt−1 < 53.23 − 2.05γ
p ). t−1
T h e r ea r ei m p o r t a n tt r e a t m e n td i ﬀerences in the inﬂuence of the past eﬀect, too. Under
the absolute norm, for example, the low past eﬀect is 0.044cjt −0.527 (cjt − 17)+,t h ev a l u e
20of which is positive when the target’s current contribution exceeds the norm, but generally
negative when it exceeds it. And while the relevant coeﬃcients are more diﬃcult to interpret
under most relative norms, the basic pattern is similar: when the representative outsider
contributes less in the last round than the session median, the past eﬀect is insigniﬁcant
when the current contribution is also less than the (new) session median - that is, small ­
but negative when it exceeds the session median.
This is perhaps another manifestation of the ostentatious contributor eﬀect. We know,
on the basis of an earlier result, that when an outgroup member deviates from a (one period)
tradition of miserliness and contributes "a lot" in the current period, the conditional level
of punishment rises with this current contribution. This result tells us, in eﬀect, that it also
increases as the mean contribution in the previous round - and thus the diﬀerence between
current and past behavior - rises.




−0.083cjt cjt ≤ 17 ijt if
dc ¯gjt−1 −4.522 + 0.183cjt if cjt > 17
when only signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are considered, which implies that once the contributions
of outgroup members in the previous round meet some threshold for generosity, the sanc­
tions imposed on any particular current contribution tend to diminish with that generosity.
Combining many of these results, we have:
Result 10. When reciprocation is possible, the sanctions imposed on outsiders
exhibit the "ostentatious contributor eﬀect," decreasing with the target’s current
contribution until the norm, absolute or relative, is reached, and increasing after
that.
As it did with insiders, the calculation of expected punishment levels now involves two
forces that work in opposite direction. The diﬀerence is that, in this case, it is the level, not
the likelihood, of punishment that embodies the pressure to conform. Furthermore, as Figure
9 reveals, the ostentatious contributor eﬀect does not dominate here: expected punishment
resembles the likelihood of punishment more than it does the level. In particular, for any
past mean contribution, it tends to decrease, sharply, as the target’s current contribution
rises, and then remain close to zero, a pattern reminiscent of the response to outsiders in the
One Way treatment.
There is, however, an important treatment diﬀerence in norm enforcement across groups.
To illustrate, suppose that c ¯gjt−1 =1 2 .5. Under the absolute norm, the model predicts
that an individual will spend 0.16 to punish a free rider in the outgroup in the One Way
21treatment, but almost double that (0.31) in the Two Way. As the current contribution is
increased to, for example, 10, the expected punishment levels fall to 0.001 and 0.04. While
there is less enthusiasm for norm enforcement here than there is within groups, there is more
than there would be in the absence of reciprocation.
Result 11. With or without reciprocation, the expected punishment of outsiders
exhibits more or less the same patterns, the most important of which is its sharp
decrease as the target’s current contribution rises. There is a diﬀerence, how-
ever: when reciprocation is possible, the level of punishment increases, ceteris
paribus.
5 Concluding Remarks
Three overarching themes emerge from our work. First, we ﬁnd that the decision to sanction
someone else is separable from the (conditional) decision about the level of sanctions. In
this context, we would conjecture that neurological evidence (de Quervain et al, 2004; Singer
et al 2006) that norm enforcement is "pleasurable" concerns the ﬁrst decision more than
the second, but this is a matter for future research. In broader terms, if norm enforcement
embodies the "action tendencies" of several diﬀerent emotions, there is much to learn about
their respective roles.
Second, there is, at best, limited evidence that the norm often assumed to drive both
decisions - that is, the local or own group average - is responsible for either, a result that,
if robust, has serious implications for the intepretation of experimental data on sanctions
and rewards. We do not pretend, of course, that our identiﬁcation of alternative norms is
deﬁnitive: it would be preferable, of course, to achieve identiﬁcation through experimental
design, and we look forward to learning how other researchers deal with this question.
Third, if, as expected, fewer and smaller sanctions are imposed on the members of other
groups, there is also some evidence that the reasons for their imposition diﬀer, too. That is,
the punishment inﬂicted on outsiders is not just a muted version of that sometimes imposed
on insiders. To the extent that the adoption of social norms is predicated on third party
punishment, the emphasis on second party punishment in the literature seems misplaced.
6 Appendix - Participant Instructions (One Way Treat-
ment)
Y o uh a v eb e e na s k e dt op a r t i c i p a t ei na ne x p e r i m e n t . F o rp a r t i c i p a t i n gt o d a ya n db e i n g
on time you have been paid $5. You may earn an additional amount of money depending
22on your decisions in the experiment. This money will be paid to you, in cash, at the end
of the experiment. When you click the BEGIN button you will be asked for some personal
information. After everyone enters this information we will start the instructions for the
experiment.
Please be patient while others ﬁnish entering their personal information. The instructions
will begin shortly.
During the experiment we will speak in terms of Experimental Monetary Units (EMUs)
instead of Dollars. Your payoﬀsw i l lb ec a l c u l a t e di nt e r m so fE M U sa n dt h e nt r a n s l a t e da t
the end of the experiment into dollars at the following rate: 30 EMUs = 1 Dollar.
In addition to the $5.00 show-up fee, each participant receives a lump sum payment of
15 EMUs at the beginning of the experiment.
The experiment is divided into 10 diﬀerent periods. In each period 8 participants are
divided into two groups of 4. The composition of the groups will remain the same for
the entire experiment. Therefore, in each period your group will consist of the same four
participants.
Each period of the experiment has three stages.
Stage One
At the beginning of every period each participant receives a 25 EMU endowment. In
Stage One each of you will decide how much of the 25 EMUs to contribute to a group
p r o j e c ta n dh o wm u c hy o uw a n tt ok e e pf o ry o u r s e l f . Y o ua r ea s k e dt oc o n t r i b u t ew h o l e
EMU amounts (i.e. a contribution of 5 EMUs is alright, but 3.85 should be rounded up to
4). Your payoﬀ and the payoﬀ of everyone else in your group will be determined by how
much each member contributes to the group project and how much each member keeps.
To record your decision, you will type EMU amounts in two text-input boxes, one for
the group project labeled GROUP ALLOCATION and one for yourself labeled PRIVATE
ALLOCATION. These boxes will be yellow. Once you have made your decision, there will
be a green SUBMIT button that will record your decision.
After all the participants have made their decisions, each of you will be informed of your
gross earnings for the period.
GROSS EARNINGS
Your Gross Earnings will consist of two parts:
1) Earnings from your Private Allocation. You are the only beneﬁciary of EMUs you
keep. More speciﬁc a l l y ,e a c hE M Uy o uk e e pi n c r e ases your earnings by one.
2) Earnings from the Group Project. Each member of the group gets the same payoﬀ
from the group project regardless of how much he or she contributed. The payoﬀ from the
23group project is calculated by multiplying 0.5 times the total EMUs contributed by the
members of your group.
Your Gross Earnings can be summarized as follows:
1 × (EMUs you keep) + 0.5 × (Total EMUs contributed by your group)
Let’s discuss three examples.
Example 1: Say each member of your group contributes 15 of their 25 EMUs. In this
case, the group total contribution to the project is 4×15 = 60 EMUs. Each group member
earns 0.5×60 = 30 EMUs from the project. The gross earnings of each member will then be
the number of EMUs kept, 25-15 = 10, plus the earnings from the group project, 30 EMUs,
for each member. Hence, each member would earn 10+30 = 40 EMUs.
Example 2: Now say everyone in the group contributes 5 EMUs. Here the group total
contribution will be 20 and each member will earn 0.5×20 = 10 EMUs from the group
project. This means that the total earnings of each member of the group will be 20 (the
number of EMUs kept) plus 10 (earnings from the group project) which equals 30 EMUs.
E x a m p l e3 :F i n a l l y ,s a yt h r e eg r o u pm e m b e r sc o n t r i b u t ea l lt h e i rE M U sa n do n ec o n ­
tributes none. In this case, the group total contribution to the project is 3×25 = 75 EMUs.
Each group member earns 0.5×75 = 37.5 EMUs from the project. The three members who
contributed everything will earn 0+37.5 = 37.5 EMUs and the one member who contributed
nothing will earn 25+37.5 = 62.5 EMUs.
Stage Two
In stage two you will be shown the allocation decisions made by all the other participants,
and they will see your decision. Also at this stage you will be able to reduce the earnings
of other participants, if you want to, and the other participants will be able to reduce your
earnings. You will be shown how much each member of your group kept and how much
they allocated to the group project. You will also be shown how much each member of the
other group kept and how much they contributed to their group project. Your allocation
decision will also appear on the screen and will be labeled ’YOU’. Please remember that the
composition of your group remains the same during each period and therefore every person
in your group during this period will also be in your group next period.
At this point you will decide how much (if at all) you wish to reduce the earnings of the
other participants. You reduce someone’s earnings by typing the number of EMUs you wish
to spend to reduce that person’s earnings into the input-text box that appears below that
participant’s allocation decision.
For each EMU you spend you will reduce the earnings of the other participant by 2
EMUs. You can spend as much of your accumulated earnings as you wish to reduce the
24earnings of the other participants.
The two groups participating in this experiment have diﬀerent opportunities to reduce
the earnings of other participants. If you are in Group A you will be able to reduce the
earnings of everyone participating in this session. That is, you will be able to reduce the
earnings of other members of your group AND you will be able to reduce the earning of the
members of Group B. However, if you are in Group B you will only be able to reduce the
earnings of the other participants in your group. The computer will inform you what group
you are randomly assigned to when it comes time to make these reduction decisions.
Consider this example: suppose you are in Group A and spend 2 EMUs to reduce the
earnings of a participant in the other group, you spend 9 EMUs reducing the earnings of
a participant in your group, and you don’t spend anything to reduce the earnings of the
remaining participants. Your total cost of reductions will be (2+9+0) or 11 EMUs. When
you have ﬁnished you will click the blue DONE button.
How much a participant’s gross earnings are reduced is determined by the total amount
spent by all the other participants in the session. If a total of 3 EMUs is, then this person’s
earnings will be reduced by 6 EMUs. If the other participants spend 4 EMUs in total, the
person’s earnings would be reduced by 8 EMUs, and so on.
Stage Three
In stage three, you will be shown the total EMUs spent on reductions by each other
participant. You will then be able to spend an additional amount of money to reduce the
earnings of the other participants, if you choose to do so.
A g a i n ,f o re a c hE M Uy o us p e n dy o uw i l lr e d u c ethe earnings of the other participant by
2 EMUs. You can spend as much of your accumulated earnings as you wish to reduce the
earnings of each of the other participants. When you have ﬁnished click the blue DONE
button.
Nobody’s earnings will be reduced below zero by the other participants. For example,
if your gross earnings were 40 EMUs and the other participants spent 50 EMUs to reduce
your earnings, your gross earnings would be reduced to zero and not minus sixty.
Your NET EARNINGS after the third stage will be calculated as follows:
(Gross Earnings from Stage One) - (2 × the Number of EMUs spent on reductions
directed towards you) - (your expenditure on reductions directed at other participants).
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, click the red FINISHED
button when you are done reading.
This is the end of the instructions. Be patient while everyone ﬁnishes reading.
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8T a b l e s a n d F i g u r e s
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics from the Experiment 
VCM  MM  One Way  Two Way 
Contribution  10.65, (9.73)  16.14, (8.75)  12.45, (7.81)  15.67, (8.13) 
Pr(Punish)  - 0.38  0.36  0.35 
Total Punishment Expenditure  - 1.44, (3.41)  1.17, (2.75)  1.91, (8.93) 
Ingroup expenditure  - 1.44, (3.41)  0.50, (1.18)  0.79, (2.92) 
Outgroup expenditure  - - 0.67, (1.57)  1.11, (5.10) 
Note: mean, (standard deviation). 
28TABLE 2: Description of the Tested Contribution Norms 
Description 
Own Contribution  Contribute at least as much as the monitor. 
Own Group 
Average  Contribute at least as much as the monitor's group average. 
Median  Contribute at least as much as the monitor's group median. 
Minimum  Contribute at least as much as the monitor's group minimum. 
Maximum  Contribute at least as much as the monitor's group maximum. 
Session 
Average  Contribute at least as much as the session average. 
Median  Contribute at least as much as the session median. 
Minimum  Contribute at least as much as the session minimum. 
Maximum  Contribute at least as much as the session maximum. 
Other Group 
Average  Contribute at least as much as the other group's average. 
Median  Contribute at least as much as the other group's median. 
Minimum  Contribute at least as much as the other group's minimum. 
Maximum  Contribute at least as much as the other group's maximum. 
Absolute Norm  Contribute at least x where x ∈[0,25]. 
29TABLE 3: Log Likelihoods For The Decision To Punish Under Different Norms 
Ingroup Punishment  Outgroup Punishment  Outgroup Punishment 
(One Way)  (Two Way) 
Own Contribution  -1409  -119  -551 
Own Group 
Average  -1442  -117  -546 
Median  -1420  -118  -547 
Minimum  -1419  -117  -556 
Maximum  -1412  -111  -555 
Session 
Average  -1409  -114  -547 
Median  -1413  -110  -549 
Minimum  -1392  -116  -552 
Maximum  -1426  -124  -556 
Target Group 
Average  -121  -559 
Median  -120  -554 
Minimum  -122  -557 
Maximum  -122  -552 
Absolute Norm  -1373  (24)  -110  (17)  -547   (12) 
Note: All models estimated as random effect probits. Norms with one of the three highest 
log likelihoods are highlighted in bold. (The best performing absolute norm). 
30TABLE 4:  Random Effects Probit Estimates Of The Decision To Punish. 
Sample:  Ingroup  Outgroup  Outgroup  Outgroup 
(One Way)  (One Way)  (Two Way) 
Norm:  Absolute (24)  Absolute  (17)  Session Median  Absolute (12) 
Target's Contribution  -0.142  -0.285  -0.167  -0.432 
[0.017]***  [0.103]***  [0.077]**  [0.103]*** 
Lag Target's Group Average  0.051  0.102  0.13  0.013 
[0.013]***  [0.056]*  [0.050]***  [0.049] 
max(Target's Contribution-Norm, 0)  4.047  0.933  -0.21  0.66 
[0.509]***  [0.389]**  [0.224]  [0.246]*** 
max(Lag Target's Group Average-Norm, 0)  0.414  -0.149  -0.165  -0.041 
[0.415]  [0.143]  [0.084]**  [0.069] 
Target's Contribution × Lag Target's Group Average  0.003  0.011  -0.001  0.03 
[0.001]***  [0.007]  [0.005]  [0.009]*** 
Target's Contribution × max(Lag Target's Group Average-Norm, 0)  -0.011  -0.055  -0.001  -0.031 
[0.025]  [0.042]  [0.012]  [0.012]*** 
Lag Target's Group Average × max(Target's Contribution-Norm, 0)  -0.246  -0.046  0.038  -0.052 
[0.030]***  [0.027]*  [0.017]**  [0.022]** 
max(Target's Contribution-Norm, 0) × max(Lag Target's Group Average-Norm, 0)  -0.021  0.162  -0.026  0.056 
[0.494]  [0.132]  [0.032]  [0.025]** 
Constant  -0.899  -2.994  -3.178  -1.515 
[0.177]***  [0.828]***  [0.962]***  [0.486]*** 
Observations  4751  1296  1296  3744 
Groups  1 7 6  3 6  3 6  1 0 4 
Notes:  Standard errors in squared brackets.  One, two and three stars denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
31TABLE 5: Log Likelihoods For The Punishment Expenditure Under Different Norms 
Ingroup Punishment  Outgroup Punishment  Outgroup Punishment 
(One Way)  (Two Way) 
Own Contribution  -1416  -83  -553 
Own Group 
Average  -1415  -86  -544 
Median  -1413  -81  -538 
Minimum  -1421  -83  -543 
Maximum  -1418  -78  -552 
Session 
Average  -1415  -75  -540 
Median  -1416  -76  -532 
Minimum  -1418  -88  -555 
Maximum  -1423  -88  -560 
Target Group 
Average  -86  -553 
Median  -86  -540 
Minimum  -87  -560 
Maximum  -88  -559 
Absolute Norm  -1409 (7)  -84 (24)  -537 (17) 
Note: All models estimated with random effect. Norms with one of the three highest log 
likelihoods are highlighted in bold. (The best performing absolute norm). 
32TABLE 6:  Random Effects Regression Estimates Of Punishment Expenditures. 
Sample:  Ingroup  Ingroup  Outgroup  Outgroup 
One Way  One Way 
Norm:  Absolute (9)  Own Group Median  Absolute  (24)  Session Median 
Target's Contribution  0.259  -0.169  -0.202  -0.438 
[0.336]  [0.061]***  [0.122]*  [0.103]*** 
Lag Target's Group Average  0.456  0.096  0.600  0.925 
[0.133]***  [0.033]***  [0.200]***  [0.114]*** 
max(Target's Contribution-Norm, 0)  1.439  0.057  0.643  0.63 
[1.910]  [0.217]  [1.666]  [0.220]*** 
max(Lag Target's Group Average-Norm, 0)  -0.42  -0.023  -0.489  -1.392 
[0.157]***  [0.190]  [2.362]  [0.245]*** 
Target's Contribution × Lag Target's Group Average  -0.067  0 
[0.040]*  [0.003] 
Target's Contribution × max(Lag Target's Group Average-Norm, 0)  0.076  0.002 
[0.043]*  [0.020] 
Lag Target's Group Average × max(Target's Contribution-Norm, 0)  -0.114  0.01 
[0.214]  [0.014] 
max(Target's Contribution-Norm, 0) × max(Lag Target's Group Average-Norm, 0)  0.091  0.048 
[0.216]  [0.043] 
Constant  0.156  2.561  -3.607  -4.759 
[1.037]  [0.545]***  [2.221]  [1.271]*** 
Observations  603  603  34  34 
Groups  134  134  12  12 
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FIGURE 1: Contribution Time Series 
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